Soft Targets

This India Today article is interesting, but largely misses the point:

They [the Maoists] are said to be attacking telecom towers to prevent the police eavesdropping on their conversations, and to neutralise police informers.

True enough as it goes… but, in a country which effectively bypassed land-lines, particularly in rural areas, disabling poorly defended mobile towers is an effective means of paralysing all rapid local communication.

More later.

Andhra CM Missing… Update 2

A couple of things… while the NSA has stated that it is unlikely that the CM’s helicopter was brought down by the Naxalites because they lack the weaponry for such a strike, this runs contrary to some previous reports. According to the Indian Express, material was seized during a raid by Jharkhand police in August 2007 which indicated that:

the extremists have been training in the use of 12.7 mm anti-aircraft guns and have already acquired 80 mm mortars and rocket-propelled grenade rifles.

The Economic Times has also claimed that unnamed ‘reports’ suggest that the Naxalites have acquired a number of anti-aircraft guns. While the Times is… umm… a little bit vague on the details, it is a surprise that the NSA has so soon and so unequivocally stated that the Naxalites do not possess the capabilities to undertake a strike against a helicopter. It’s a bit premature.

September/Post-Monsoon Offensive Watch

It seems increasingly likely that the Singh government will launch a major anti-Naxalite offensive sometime after 1 September. I was contacted recently by someone working closely with the state police in Chhattisgarh who has said as much (trying to find out more). There have also been a number of stories in the Indian media lending credibility to this claim, including the recent re-deployment of 5,000 Border Security Personnel into India’s eastern states.

Additionally, the Maoists, in anticipation of a major counter-insurgency campaign by the Centre, are allegedly preparing themselves by intensifying their operations. The CPI (Maoist) Politburo has, according to Rediff, issued a circular:

The politburo circular also has enough indications that the Maoist strategy to counter the proposed government offensive is to step up violence in their strongholds through what the Maoists call a Tactical Counter Offensive Campaign.

“We have to further aggravate the situation and create more difficulties to the enemy forces by expanding our guerrilla war to new areas on the one hand and intensifying the mass resistance in the existing areas so as to disperse the enemy forces over a sufficiently wider area;

“Hence the foremost task in every state is to intensify the war in their respective states while in areas of intense enemy repression there is need to expand the area of struggle by proper planning by the concerned committees; tactical counter-offensives should be stepped up and also taken up in new areas so as to divert a section of the enemy forces from attacking our guerrilla bases and organs of political power,” the politburo said.

Now would be a logical time for Delhi to try and push the Maoists out of their jungle strongholds. The Singh government has just waged a successful re-election campaign and is politically safe in case something goes terribly wrong. Additionally, India’s Forgotten War is no longer so forgotten. It has reached a tipping point. The Maoists are a growing threat to the state which can and is no longer being ignored. The Singh government knows that it must tackle them before the Maoists are in a position to seriously resist a concerted government counter-insurgency campaign. Now is the time for any rational government to move to prevent risking intolerable political and security costs.

The question is, how effective will a government strike on the heart of Naxal country be? More to come.

State Within a State Part 1

This story is significant. The Naxalite’s brief detention and search of a government official travelling on southern Chhattisgarh’s main highway is a relatively minor incident which highlights how the Indian government has lost control over large parts of the country:

The last three months have seen the Maoists tightening their grip on Chhattisgarh and the amount of control that they exercise over National Highway 43 is disturbing, intelligence officials told rediff.com. “The situation has worsened ever since the elections. They [Maoists] have gone from strength to strength. While the massacre of more than 30 people including a superintendent of police made headlines, the truth is that they have become even stronger in the Bastar region,” said a senior state intelligence officer.

Other intelligence sources agreed that the impunity with which the rebels have started raiding and imposing themselves on NH 43 is a disturbing sign of their increasing clout in the region.

I travelled on NH 43 back in late 2007 and was told by a local CRPF commander that while security forces controlled the road during the day, the Naxalite writ ran during the night. Since that time, it seems that the government has lost further ground as the Maoists have strengthened their grip over southern Chhattisgarh. They administer justice, collect taxes and control access in an out of the region. They have virtually established a state within a state.

CPI (Maoist) Documents

Bannedthought.net has a great collection of interviews and documents from the CPI (Maoist) here. Well done! The Naxalites are a fairly shadowy organisation and tracking documents and/or statements from the Party itself is a bit of challenge. This site is a solid source of primary information and I would recommend it to anyone who wants to learn more about the Naxalites world-view and their tactical/strategic analysis.

War of Words in West Bengal

The virtual civil war in West Bengal continues apace. While anti-Naxal operations in Lalgarh are ongoing,  both the opposition Trinamool Congress and the governing Communist Party of India (Marxist) continue to accuse each other of orchestrating a campaign of murder against their respective cadres.

What is clear in the war of words is that West Bengal’s nearly three decade long rural political structure is in the process of distintegration. Both the Trinamool Congress and the Maoists stand to gain from the CPI(M)’s weakening rural electoral machine. Trinamool is envisioning itself as head of government and the Naxalites see an opportunity to re-establish themselves in the state which gave them birth. What if the Left Front does fall and Trinamool takes its place in Calcutta? Would there be a government in West Bengal which owed the Naxalites a tremendous debt? Or would any temporary tactical alliance be jettisoned by a new government? In either scenario the Naxalites would emerge victorious. They would have emerged in West Bengal with a stronger presence and reach than they have enjoyed since the early 1970s. They will be in a position to either directly pressure the state government or threaten it militarily.

The Trinamool Congress, never consistent ideologically, is playing a dangerous game. The CPI(M), on the other hand, bears most of the blame for the current situation. They are a party which has failed to adequately realise their developmental vision. They have deployed their powerful party machinery in an arbitrary and often violent way, alienating precisely those people who make up their natural constituency.

Image: Rediff

India’s Forgotten War Intensifies

First, my apologies for being relatively erratic with updates. I’m in the process of re-locating to Ottawa and just haven’t had time to do much with India’s Forgotten War. All of this is unfortunate timing on my part, because recent developments in the Maoist insurgency suggest that we may be witnessing not only the intensification of the war, but an evolution in its nature. The Naxalites have never presented as much of a threat to the stability of the state as they do now.

In the past month, the Naxalites have flexed their muscles and declared a ‘Liberated Zone’ in West Bengal. While government forces have re-established nominal control over Lalgarh, they have failed to inflict significant casualties on the Maoists who, having made their point, have simply melted back into the jungle.

This was followed last week by a major attack which killed at least 30 CRPF personnel (a number are still missing and unaccounted for). The attack was significant because not only was it a well co-ordinated, twin ambush, but the it occured near to Chattisgarh’s capital, Ranchi Raipur (thanks to Rahul for catching my mistake).

Additionally, last week, PTI reported that:

An inter-state Maoist arms racket has been busted with the arrest of a businessman in the national capital and his counterpart in Jharkhand with recovery of a huge cache of bulletproof jackets and sophisticated gadgets.

While the existence of nascent urban Maoist cells is not news to anyone who has followed the growing tentacles of Naxalism in India, the arrests have made explicit the complex logistics and ideological networks which exist across the entire country. Revolutionary Maoism is not only a rural phenomenon that affects the poorest and most backward districts of the country. It is a national movement dedicated to the overthrow of India’s current system of government.

Finally, demonstrating the new confidence of the Naxalites and perhaps signalling a shift in tactics, a spokesperson for the CPI (Maoist) has threatened to:

[R]esort to LTTE-style attacks against Congress President Sonia Gandhi and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh... A threat has also been issued against Union Home Minister P Chidambaram, the release said and asked all Congress legislators, both from Parliament and assembly, to quit within a week or face “death warrants”.

What has the government response been? As mentioned in a previous post, Delhi has now formally proscribed the CPI (Maoist) and a number of affiliated groups as ‘terrorists’. Beyond that, there are unconfirmed reports that the government is planning a major, co-ordinated counter-insurgency campaign in the most badly affected districts this September. I hope to have more on this soon.

In the meantime, not much seems to have changed. The Naxalites are branching out tactically and territorially. They seem to have calculated that they are now in a position to intensify their insurgency. And, so far, the government has not seemed fit to meet this threat.

(Image: Manpreet Romana/AFP)

11 Police Killed in Jharkhand

Another big attack. 11 CRPF members were killed by a large IED.

The New Indian Internal Security Environment

The figures for the past four years are out and the centre of political violence in India is shifting. The insurgencies in the North East and Kashmir have recorded declines in numbers of those killed, while the deaths of civilians, security personnel and Maoists has doubled. The absolute number of deaths recorded in the Naxal war has also exceeded that of both other internal conflicts.

The new Indian reality.

Helping the Insurgency- One Human Rights Violation at a Time

The Asian Centre for Human Rights has released its 2009 report on India. It can be found here.

The report heavily criticises the conduct of the state in their war against the Naxalites. In particular, the government and security force’s conduct in Chhattisgarh, the epicentre of the conflict, comes in for a drubbing:

The security forces and the state sponsored civilian militia Salwa Judum cadres were responsible for gross human rights violations in the name of counter insurgency operations.

Of course, the standard line amongst apologists for a flawed counter-insurgency policy is to question the neutrality of organisations such as the Asian Centre for Human Rights. This may be a reasonable strategy when defending the indefensible, but it’s hardly convincing.

Much of India’s disjointed anti-Naxalite counter-insurgency strategy is counter-productive. Setting aside for a moment the morality of a scorched earth campaign (which is, in effect, the approach that has been taken in Chhattisgarh), such an approach doesn’t work in a country such as India.

Terrorising a population into submission and ensuring that the cost for individuals and communities who support insurgents is intolerably high can work, if it works at all, only in a more monolithic and authoritarian state. In a state like India, the terror can and always will be limited in scope and scale. The result is simply creating more resentment and fear, further boosting the credibility and the ranks of the Maoists.

Salwa Judum is a failure. The creation of SPOs is a failure. The forced re-settlement of Adivasi is also a failure. The government needs to be smarter and more flexible than the Naxalites. Of course, there are the two priorities of a unified response as well as smart development measures targeting areas at risk from Naxalism. Equally important is the deployment of flexible, highly mobile and disciplined troops who can respond to information gleaned both from real-time monitoring and the cultivation of so-called human intelligence. This will not be possible if the state alienates the population by sanctioning brutality against the innocent.